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WHOSE BEST PRACTICES? THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONTEXT IN AND FOR 
TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE INDICATORS 
David Nelken* 
 
'to change something you do not understand is the true nature of evil.'1 
 
The questions posed by the editors of this special issue include the following:  'If transfers of policy 
and practice can sometimes be desirable, what part can or should cross-cultural research play in 
defining good transnational practice and assessing the consequences, both good and bad, of 
transfer? What kinds of comparative research might be appropriate to the task? To what extent is it 
desirable to seek to identify transnational good or best practice? What are the difficulties and 
challenges in doing so validly?'2The claim to be made here is that some light may be thrown on 
these difficult issues also by starting the other way round, by examining the spread of so-called 
global social indicators as a series of projects that themselves presuppose and serve to produce what 
counts as 'good' practice.  
To appreciate how what come to be defined as best practices are constructed, we need to understand 
the type of comparisons that these projects rely on. Studying the role of comparison in global 
indicators in this way is an example of what can be called 'second order' comparison where the aim 
is less to engage in comparison directly than to study comparisons as a social practice engaged in by 
others.3 It involves studying the way individuals, agencies and organizations actually go about 
 
* Professor of Transnational and Comparative Law, King's College, London. 
1 J. Winterson,  (1991) Oranges are not the only fruit, London, Vintage (1991): 138. 
2 This paper is a much revised version of one presented at the Cardiff workshop on 'Best practice in 
security and justice: from cross-cultural description and explanation to transnational prescription?' 
15-16 May 2017. 
3 For previous efforts to develop this argument see D. Nelken, ‘The changing roles of social 
indicators: from explanation to governance’, in P. Alldridge, L. Cheliotis and V. Mitsilegas (eds.), 
Globalisation, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice: Theoretical, Comparative and Transnational 
 2 
comparing. It asks what claims - whether true or not4- are made about what goes on in other places 
so as to understand when, where and why descriptions and evaluations are found plausible and what 
consequences follow. Those following this approach focus less on the eventual effects of indicators 
than on the sites of formulation, use, and resistance to indicators, in places such as committee rooms 
or offices, typically far from the sites where the data is collected. They seek to understand the 
'politics of comparison' for those comparing and those being compared. 
 The paper begins by describing the increasing attention being paid by comparative criminal 
justice scholars to processes of legal and policy transfers and the spreading of global prescriptions, 
and notes the call for criminologists to support and criticize the recent global targets set by the 
United Nations in the field of criminal justice. It goes on to distinguish the goals of different kinds 
of comparisons, and shows the way different purposes shape the use of indicators and the 
importance given to understanding the contexts being compared. Crucially, it argues that those 
engaged in exercises of transnational ranking and target setting may often be more interested in 
changing contexts than in understanding them. The paper then revisits the debate concerning the so-
called knowledge and governance 'effects' of social indicators so as to discuss the implications these 
have for efforts to pursue global projects of social improvement.  
 
From comparative criminal justice to global prescriptions 
 
It is increasingly recognised that it makes little sense to think about criminal justice systems in 
terms of separable national jurisdictions at a time of international and transnational links between 
both crime threats and criminal justice responses.5 Local debates make ever more reference to what 
 
Perspectives (2015) 25-44; and D. Nelken, 'From pains-taking to pains-giving comparisons' (2016) 
12 International Journal of Law in Context, 390-403. 
4 See e.g. the views of Polish prosecutors concerning decision making by their colleagues in Western 
Europe cited in P. Polak and D. Nelken, 'Polish Prosecutors, Corruption and Legal Culture', in A. 
Febbrajo and W. Sadurski eds. East-Central Europe After Transition: Towards a New Socio-Legal 
Semantics. (2010) 219-254. 
5 D. Nelken, 'The challenge to comparative criminal justice' in Globalisation and the challenge to 
Criminology, ed. F. Pakes (2012) 9-26. See also (discussing maximalist and minimalist definitions 
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is (said to be) going on in other places, and decisions about criminal justice are made not only in 
response to local challenges but also so as to (re)position a society in relation to others.6 Well 
known examples here include Finland's reaction to published rankings of its high incarceration rates  
as compared to its Scandinavian neighbours,7 or the shock experienced in the Netherlands at its 
relatively high crime rate reported by the first International Crime Victimisation Survey in 1989 
(largely attributed to the relatively high rate of bicycle theft).8  
There is wide agreement that students of comparative criminal justice need to pay more attention to 
what actually happens when transnational developments encounter the national and local levels.9 
Some scholars even go as far as arguing that the increasing salience of these interactions means  
that we should abandon comparative criminal justice, especially that based on comparing national 
units, in favour of a focus on global and transnational crime and criminal justice.10  But despite 
repeated calls for the study of such processes there is still little agreement on how best to study how 
change is produced through relational comparisons rather than endogenous developments. What 
 
of transnational criminal law) R. Ivory 'Beyond transnational criminal law: anti-corruption as global 
new governance' (2018) 6 London Review of International Law 413–442. 
6 See e.g. T. Newburn, and R. Sparks (eds.) Criminal Justice and Political Cultures: National and 
International Dimensions of Crime Control (2004), and D. Melossi, M. Sozzo, R. Sparks, (eds.) 
Travels of the Criminal Question: Cultural Embeddedness and Diffusion (2011).  
7Tapio Lappi-Seppala, 'The Fall of the Finnish Prison Population' (2000) 1 Journal of Scandinavian 
Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention1. 
8 See J. J.M. van Dijk, ‘The International Crime Survey: a tool for the planning and evalution of 
national crime policies’, International Conference on Understanding Crime: Experiences of Crime 
and Crime- Control (1992) Rome, at:  https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Photocopy/136446NCJRS.pdf 
accessed 20/5/2019. 
9 See, most recently, T. Newburn, T. Jones, and J. Blaustein, 'Policy mobilities and comparative 
penality ' (2018) 22 Theoretical Criminology 563-581. The authors rightly note the difference 
between what they call ' talk, decision and action'.  
10N. Larsen and R. Smandych (eds.) Global Criminology and Criminal Justice: Current Issues and Perspectives, 
(2008). But see the reservations expressed by Piers Beirne in his 'Preface' to their collection at p. ix. Cf. also F. Pakes, 
'The Comparative Method in Globalised Criminology' (2010) 43 Australian & New Zealand Journal of Criminology. 
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actors are involved in projecting and implementing comparisons?11 Who provides the evidence (or 
gossip?) that shapes patterns of emulation and conformity? What other forms of knowledge are 
being suppressed?12 The  need for case studies is especially pressing given the equivocal findings of 
those we have so far. For example, even where cultural traditions about criminal justice were 
seemingly most compatible -  as between the USA and England and Wales - attempts to mimic 
American punitive strategies such as 'three strikes and you are out' had limited effects in practice.13 
On the other hand, other institutional inventions borrowed from the USA, such as problem-solving 
courts, have succeeded in spreading without difficulty, at least in the common law world.14 But 
what explains the difference?  
New questions are posed if we turn from considering the case of specific legal transfers and 
transplants to asking how generalising global prescriptions are made and spread. What legitimates 
official criminal justice comparisons, who are (and who are not) consulted - in short, whose voices 
matter? Typically such exercises are outsourced to local experts. But what makes someone an 
expert? How much is it important that they know about their own systems and how much that they 
are familiar with looking at other systems? Who chooses such experts? These questions are key to 
understanding for example the work of the UN and the EU in creating model laws and monitoring 
minimum standards of best practice in criminal justice.15  The United Nations Office on Drugs and 
 
11 D, Nelken (ed.) Comparative Criminal Justice and Globalisation, (2011). See also F. Heidensohn, 
'Doing research on crime and justice' in R. D. King and E. Winkup (eds.) International comparative 
research in criminology (2007) 199-229, and F. Heidensohn, 'Contrasts and concepts: considering 
the development of comparative criminology' in T. Newburn, and P. Rock (eds.) The Politics of Crime 
Control: Essays in Honour of David Downes (2009) 173-196. 
12 E. Darian-Smith. Laws and Societies in Global Contexts: Contemporary Approaches (2013); B. 
de Sousa Santos, Epistemologies of the South: Justice Against Epistemicide (2016). 
13  T. Jones and T. Newburn,'Policy Transfer and Criminal Justice: Exploring US Influence over 
British Crime Control Policy (2007). 
14 J. Nolan Legal accents, legal borrowing: The international problem-solving court movement 
(2009).   
15 See e.g. UNODC’s data and analysis index at  https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-
analysis/index.html, accessed 20/05/2019; EMCDDA’s policy and practice briefings on the 
criminal justice system: http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/best-practice/briefings/prisons-and-the-
criminal-justice-system_en, accessed: 20/05/2019; and the work of the Council of Europe European 
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Crime (UNODC) sets out guidelines, initiated in 2008, about 'Good practices in the protection of 
witnesses in criminal proceedings involving organized crime.' It tells us that 'good practices were 
developed in a series of regional meetings comprised of expert representatives from the criminal 
justice sector'16. It also explains that it uses experts to implement transnational and international 
standards.17  
But is a global 'gaze' on crime threats and criminal justice really possible? Can it avoid the risk of 
taking as global what is in fact local? How is the globalisation of the 'local' accomplished? UNODC 
informs us that it 'develops model laws and model provisions with the view to assisting 
governments to translate their obligations under international treaties into national legislative 
provisions... The model laws are not intended to replace the meticulous process of drafting national 
legislation and they focus on substance over form that differs depending on the legal system of a 
given state' (my underlining).18 So far they have sponsored model laws against trafficking in 
persons and against the smuggling of migrants (both in 2010)  and concerning Money-Laundering 
and Financing of Terrorism (in 2005 and 2009).19 But, given the variation in the interests and values 
of the countries affected by these problems,20 the appeal to substance over form  may underestimate 
what is at stake in writing similar laws for very different places. 
 
 
Commission for the efficiency of justice: https://www.coe.int/en/web/cepej/home, accessed 
20/05/2019. 
16 See https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/tools-and-
publications.html#Manuals_Handbooks Best_Practices.accessed 20/5/2019. 
17 The United Nations Convention against Corruption for example relies on an Implementation 
Review Mechanism (IRM), now in its second cycle. This is a peer review process that assists State 
parties to effectively implement the Convention. Each state is allowed to nominate up to 15 experts 
and each State party is reviewed by two peers - one from the same regional group - which are 
selected by a drawing of lots at the beginning of each year of the review cycle. See 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/corruption/index.html?ref=menuside, accessed 20/5/2019. 
18 op.cit. note 18. 
19 id. 
20 See e.g. D.Nelken ' Human Trafficking and Legal Culture ' (2010) 43 Isr. L. Rev. 479.  
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The challenges of reaching cross national understanding have of course long been noted in the way 
criminologists use comparative statistical indicators such as prison and recidivism rates in their 
research and policy making. But more and more - and it is this which interests us here - criminologists 
are also being encouraged to engage with global social indicators21 as the kind of information which 
can be used to assess progress in dealing with these transnational social problems. In a recent 
important contribution Blaustein et. al. urge criminologists to give more attention to the recently 
announced United Nations sustainability development goals (SDG's).22 This ambitious UN initiative 
sets out a range of seventeen idealistic targets to be achieved by 2030 (starting from, as target number 
1, 'no poverty').23 Blaustein et. al. explain that, unlike the previous Millennium Development goals 
that this initiative replaces, these targets also address issues relating to crime, justice and security, 
treating domestic crime problems as a transnational challenge and transnational problems as a local 
one, and mandating the exchange of best practices as a way achieving progress. Thus, under the 
heading 'The Road to 2030, Achieving the Goals', the UN website tells us: 
   'Action to achieve the SDG's must take place at many levels, but action at the local level is 
critical. The High-Level Political Forum serves as the essential global forum for providing political 
leadership, guidance on achieving the SDG's by 2030 through the sharing of experiences, including 
success stories on the ground, as well as developing recommendations for strengthening 
implementation, follow up and review of the SDG's. In this role the Forum promotes accountability, 
fostering an exchange of best practices and supporting international cooperation...The Forum also 
provides an opportunity for the international community to review progress on the Goals in regions 
 
21 A global social indicator is defined by leading commentators as 'a named collection of rank-
ordered data that purports to represent the past or projected performance of different units. The data 
are generated through a process that simplifies raw data about a complex social phenomenon. The 
data, in this simplified and processed form, are capable of being used to compare particular units of 
analysis (such as countries or institutions or corporations), synchronically or over time, and to 
evaluate their performance by reference to one or more standards’. See K. Davis, B. Kingsbury and 
S. Merry Governance by Indicators. Global Power through Quantification and Rankings (2012), 6. 
 
22 J. Blaustein, N. Pino, K. Fitz-Gibbon, and R. White, 'Criminology and the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals: The Need for Support and Critique' (2017) 58 British J. of Criminology 767-
786. 
23 See https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/monitoring-and-progress-hlpf/. accessed 30/12/ 
2018. 
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where there are countries experiencing certain risks and vulnerabilities and includes Voluntary 
National Reviews of the participating countries, which are intended to track and accelerate progress 
in implementing the 2020 Agenda, with a particular focus on the poorest, most vulnerable and those 
furthest behind.’ 24 
Blaustein et. al. argue that criminologists should both support this endeavour and also act as 
friendly critics. Working with NGOs, they believe, can provide a platform for moral 
entrepreneurship.It can assist with the design, implementation and evaluation of projects that 
contribute to safe, just and sustainable societies. This can then help for example to eradicate forced 
labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secure the prohibition and elimination of the 
worst forms of child labour, and promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, 
including migrant workers, in particular women workers, and those in precarious employment.25 On 
the other hand, their support for such  a commitment is balanced by critique based on 'caution', 
‘scepticism’, and making reference to Southern epistemologies.  
This leads them to query both the definition of the problems and the solutions to the problems 
that the UN targets are there to measure. In terms of definitions, they note that ‘reducing violence, 
promoting the rule of law, fighting corruption and improving access to justice are hardly controversial 
aspirations', especially as the 'SDG 16 is neither prescriptive nor restrictive about how these targets 
should be met.' 26 But they go on to add that such aspirations may be uncontroversial only because 
they mean different things to different people (at different times and in different places). They explain 
that,  
'the neutral language of the SDGs serves to mask the political complexities and fault-
lines of the crime-development nexus. For example, SDG 16.2 includes a reference to the 
term ‘trafficking’. No criminologist would contest that the exploitation or abuse of children 
is deeply problematic but ‘trafficking’ is a messy concept that eludes simple definition and 
measurement.'  
For them, ' failure to interrogate these targets and approach them with caution may therefore result in 
the validation and dissemination of harmful and counterproductive policies.'27 They acknowledge, 
likewise, 'that the targets on gender-based violence are drafted using vague and outwardly innocuous 
language that often masks contentious issues noting that ' there is an ongoing debate between radical 
 
24 id. 
25 Blaustein et.al 2017, op.cit. note 25. 
26 id. 775. 
27 id. 776 
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and intersectional feminists about whether or not commercial sex should be treated as a form of 
violence against women.'28 In terms of solutions, on the other hand, they highlight the danger that 
strengthening criminal justice could lead to 'inappropriate, criminogenic, oppressive, unjust or 
otherwise harmful crime control policies and (..) may be used to disproportionately target ethnic 
minority and indigenous communities thereby resulting in human rights violations and potentially 
undermining the legitimacy of the police'.29  
Despite these reservations, for Blaustein et. al., the SDG's target setting 'provides the best 
available framework for balancing local development and security needs with global priorities of 
criminological concern, including the protection of human rights and environmental justice.' 30 In 
large part, this is because this initiative endorses the Sen-Nussbaum 'human capabilities' approach,31 
which focuses more on measures of life chances in health and education than on criteria related to the 
neo-liberal drive to stimulate economic growth by expanding market freedom. It will be argued here 
however that there may be drawbacks in pursuing even noble aims through the use of global 
indicators.32 The approach taken by Blaustein et. al. fails to engage with those writers who see the 
drive to spread human and civil rights through criminal justice indicators as itself an intrinsic feature 
of current forms of governmentality.33 Rather than just providing measures of best practice in 
domestic and transnational efforts to improve criminal justice responses, the exercise in comparison 
 
28 id. 778. 
29 id. 776. 
30 id. 769. 
31 See M. C. Nussbaum, “Capabilities of Human Rights” (1997) 66 Fordham L. Rev. 273; A. Sen, 
Development as Freedom (1999).  Blaustein et. al. note 25, therefore reject Escobar's (earlier) call 
for ‘alternatives to development’ as opposed to alternative models of development. See, however,  
W. Davies, 'Spirits of Neoliberalism: ‘Competitiveness’ and ‘Wellbeing’ Indicators as Rival Orders 
of Worth', in R. Rottenburg et al. (eds.) The World of Indicators. The Making of Governmental 
Knowledge through Quantification (2015), 285.   
32 e.g. Blaustein et. al. (op. cit. note 25, 778) argue that 'Criminologists might therefore help 
development actors separate evidence about commercial sex work from ideology and ensure that 
the language of these targets is not misconstrued for ideological purposes'. 
33 See B. Sokhi -Bulley ‘Governing (through) Rights: Statistics as technologies of governmentality’, 
(2011) 20 Social & Legal Studies 139–55 and her Governing (through) Rights (2016). 
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that characterise global indicators can itself be seen as a form of social control.34 Thus, even if the 
goals sought by indicators are different from neo- liberal ones they still aim at the 'responsibilisation' 
of states, corporations and individuals. Because they thus reflect and reproduce 'audit society', 
indicators are more than just neutral  tools.35 To make these points clearer we will now investigate 
the way comparison works when it is linked to target setting as a key element in the now considerable 
literature describing and criticising reliance on global social indicators.36 
 
The aims of comparison, the uses of indicators, and the relevance of context 
 
How do global indicators recognize good practices? What type of comparisons are produced 
in doing so? What are the relevant 'contexts' of such comparisons? In general, types of comparisons 
can be distinguished into 1) 'disciplinary comparisons', concerned with understanding difference for 
its own sake, 2) those where policy evaluations are uppermost, and 3) those where differences in 
current standards are ranked so as to provide a basis for informed choice and/or bring about changed 
behaviour.37 The aim of ‘disciplinary comparisons’ is to describe, understand or explain social 
variation as part of developing a given intellectual discipline such as history, sociology, anthropology 
or political science. Their findings may also have implications for policy making; but at least some 
of the searched for links between variables may not lend themselves to easy manipulation. Where 
 
34 We shall be concentrating here on the links between indicators and comparison. But the UN 
Sustainability targets can of course also be examined under other headings, such as the way they set 
about the tasks of goal setting, rule making and norm promotion, see e.g. Governing through Goals: 
Sustainable Development Goals as Governance Innovation, eds. N. Kanie and F. Biermann (2017). 
35 C. Shore, and S. Wright ‘Governing by Numbers: Audit Culture, Rankings and the New World 
Order’ (2015) 23 Social Anthropology, 22-28. 
36 Useful collections of case studies include Davis et. al., op.cit. note 24; B. Frydman and A.Van 
Waeyenberge eds., Gouverner par les standards et les indicateurs. De Hume aux rankings (2014); 
S. E. Merry, K. E. Davis and B. Kingsbury eds., The Quiet Power of Indicators. Measuring 
Governance, Corruption, and Rule of Law (2015); Rottenberg  (2015) op.cit. note 34; M. Siems and 
D. Nelken (eds.) Global social indicators: Constructing Transnational legitimacy (2017) 13 
International Journal of Law in Context; D. V. Malito, G. Umbach, N. Bhuta, (eds.) The Palgrave 
Handbook of Indicators in Global Governance (2018). 
37 see Nelken, op.cit. (2016), n. 3.  
 10 
comparison is guided by policy, it usually serves as a means to learn from what are claimed to be 
better (or, more rarely, worse) practices elsewhere, or to compare outcomes of planned change against 
intentions or benchmarks. The final approach to comparison, which is most relevant here, may be 
called 'ranking comparisons'. Amongst other goals these are used to justify distributary or other 
decisions as well as influence countries or organisation to take responsibility for their behaviour so 
as to improve performance.38 
Comparative enquiries make use of indicators in different ways. In terms of our three kinds of 
comparison we can speak for example of 1) explanatory indicators, meaning the indices or proxies 
that social scientists use when seeking to construct explanations of variance in furtherance of 
theoretical claims about connections between variables - for example between corruption and 
economic development. In one mainstream version of this type of comparison, any such correlations 
found may then be tested for statistical significance. Alternatively, there are 2) policy indicators, that 
is, measures or targets used in evaluating the performance of institutions or setting and assessing the 
results of social interventions. Finally, when it comes to ranking comparisons, there are 3) the type 
of indicators of standards that are designed to raise standards such as the UN SDG targets that 
Blaustein et. al. discuss.  
Approaches to comparison have different ways of attributing relevance to context - even if 
there are also crucial internal disagreements. Disciplinary comparisons have in common their aim to 
identify what is similar and different in various contexts. But they can do so for example either by 
searching for invariant links, say between age and crime across all contexts, or by focusing on the 
specificity of concepts in varying social and cultural settings, when using interpretative approaches 
such as 'thick description'. With the positivist 'view from nowhere,' context means the play of 
theoretically selected variables. For the more interpretative approaches, the view is always 'from 
somewhere' and context is brought into perspective by moving between the 'etic' and 'emic' stances, 
or external and internal perspectives, in the effort to grasp the meaning of social practices to the actors 
involved in them.  
Those engaged in the second type of comparison that we have identified also tend to adopt a 
'view from somewhere' as they seek to learn lessons about potentially useful new institutions and 
practices to apply in their own contexts. What matters for them above all is how to change a given 
context for the better. Those seeking to import ideas from elsewhere may even willingly overlook 
 
38 The range of functions of these kind of indicators is captured in the title of a recent study of the 
application of ranking indicators in the university world see W.N. Espeland, Engines of Anxiety: 
Academic Rankings, Reputation and Accountability (2016). 
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aspects that distinguish the originating context since for them the crucial issue is whether they can 
stimulate efforts to bring about changes in the new context.39 With ranking exercises, especially where 
the aim is to change other places, the claim made is usually more universalistic. Those who make 
them are concerned with judging conduct according to a standard that transcends the contexts which 
may shape the conduct concerned. Their purported 'view from everywhere' creates a score for each 
unit being judged relative to an external target or standard. 40 
The polysemic meanings of the term indicators embrace promiscuously all of these scientific, 
pragmatic and programmatic uses. But paying more attention to the logics of comparison built into 
different kinds of indicators could help clarify how they should be understood and criticised in 
different ways. John Muncie and Barry Goldson, for example, in their influential work on 
comparative youth justice, helpfully put together explanations why some prison numbers are out of 
line with other places whilst also assessing countries with high incarceration rates in terms of their 
poor records of compliance with human rights.41 But the way they argue their case  shows clearly that 
explaining which of a variety of factors best correlates with incarceration rates requires different types 
of evidence to that which is needed when criticizing criminal justice standards.  What makes sense 
when indicators are used for explanatory purposes may be less appropriate when indicators are used 
for policy interventions or for schemes for naming and shaming - and vice versa. Deciding whether 
places are more or are less severe towards offenders requires that we compare 'like with like' regarding 
crime challenges, and also paying attention, as is not always done, to the relative availability in each 
society of alternative ways of preventing or resolving them. But showing that places are less 
 
39 D. Nelken,‘Foil comparisons or foiled comparisons? Learning from Italian juvenile justice’ (2015) 
12 European Journal of Criminology 519-534.  
40 Leading exponents of evaluation such as R. Pawson and N. Tilley, (Realistic Evaluation (1997)) 
tell us that it is essential to understand contexts in any attempt to assess the likely success of an 
intervention. Context for them does not necessarily coincide with locality but refers to the 
conditions needed for a given measure to trigger mechanisms to produce particular outcomes 
patterns. The question that they say needs to be asked is what works, for whom, in what 
circumstances? But to find the answer to that question requires purposefully gathering appropriate 
data about relevant differences in conditions, not, as ranking indicators usually tend to do, putting 
together whatever is available. 
41 See e.g. B. Goldson,  'Reading the present and mapping the future(s) of juvenile justice in Europe: 
complexities and challenges,' in B. Goldson ed. Juvenile Justice in Europe: Past, present and future, 
(2019) 209-253. 
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successful than others in their achievement of given standards does not presuppose that 'like is being 
compared with like', but on the contrary assumes that it is right (or at least useful) to hold all places 
to the same standard. In many respects it is precisely non-comparable places that are being compared. 
In general. if we are deciding where to invest and are concerned with local levels of respect for the 
rule of law it matters little that it is not 'fair' to compare Australia with Somalia. Where indicators 
refer to standards the more relevant question is whether the indicator chosen is a reliable pointer to 
whether the standard is being met. And, for at least some users of ranking indicators, it may be a moot 
question why they are not being met or even how they could be induced to raise their standards.  
On the other hand, indicators used in different kinds of comparisons can also be seen as social 
constructions. Take the distinction between first and second order comparison. Studies of criminal 
justice indicators of all kinds show us that what appear to be the 'brute facts' which lie behind reported 
rates of crime, conviction and incarceration are in practice the result of judgements by those doing 
the counting. It is what these actors think does or should count as crime or deviance that matters rather 
than levels of behaviour as such.42 The rates and patterns we are examining are produced by actors 
relying on their own social theories of the causes of deviance and sometimes deliberately seeking to 
massage the figures for outside consumption. And numbers can be given different meanings 
depending on the purpose at hand (note the wording in the previously cited definition of global social 
indicators which speaks of 'capable of being used').  
Take, for example, the international statistics of numbers of people in prison that have been used in 
the recent debate and interventions that concern alleged growth in punitiveness.43 For the first type 
of comparison these numbers are taken as a (crude) indicator of levels of relative harshness that is 
then linked to contextual variables such as geographical situation, or political and economic factors 
such as the influence of neo liberal policies and sentiments (with countries following neo-liberal 
politics having the highest incarceration rates). For the second type of comparison they help to provide 
a measure of whether a given type of disposal is likely to lead to more or less people ending up in 
prison. For the third kind of comparison, prison rates may be taken as a pointer to whether enough is 
 
42 See J. D. Douglas, The Social Meanings of Suicide (1967/2015); J. Kitsuse and A. Cicourel, ' A 
Note on the Uses of Official Statistics' (1963) 11 Social Problems 131–139; H. Von Hofer, 'Prison 
Populations as Political Constructs: The Case of Finland, Holland and Sweden' (2003) 4 Journal of 
Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 21 – 38. 
43 M. Cavadino and J. Dignan etc. Penal Systems: A Comparative Approach (2005); J. Pratt, D. 
Brown, M. Brown, S. Hallworth, eds. The New Punitiveness: Trends, Theories, Perspectives (2005) 
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being done to comply with international or transnational directives or treaties that relate to the 
organization of criminal justice proceedings. A figure such as a hundred prisoners in every hundred 
thousand of the population (based on what is found to be normal in a selection of developed 
economies, but not including the USA) can be re-purposed as a standard setting out limits of how 
many people should be imprisoned and a means of naming and shaming so as to bring about such 
change. Such claims about what is 'normal' may then get institutionalized as targets for good practice 
by some global social indicators. 
 Only empirical research can show us whether and when a given indicator is being used to 
measure, evaluate or guide behaviour. But it is likely that it will be involved in more than one of these 
tasks. Academic work that seeks explanation often also has a practical agenda; those trying to explain 
variability in prison  rates are usually hoping that they may find a way to reduce unnecessary 
incarceration.44 Like those designing global indicators, scholars engaged in disciplinary comparisons 
may use evaluative terms such as 'punitiveness', even if is far from obvious that this term has cross 
cultural meaning. Conversely, social scientists may be willing to make use for explanatory purposes 
of data deriving from indicators that were developed for the purposes of ranking and evaluation rather 
than explanation. Susanne Karstedt, for example, has tried to demonstrate a relationship between  the 
evaluative category of ‘failed state’ developed for ranking indicators by USA foreign policy 
advisors45 with international levels of corruption.46 Explanation and learning also come together in 
the search for 'what works' in criminal justice for those who mimic the experimental or quasi-
experimental approach of the hard sciences.47And, commonly, ranking indicators rely on the other 
 
44 As pointed out some time ago by Ken Pease in his  'Cross-National Imprisonment Rates - 
Limitations of Method and Possible Conclusions' (1994) 34 British Journal of Criminology 116-
130.  See also D. Nelken, 'Comparative Criminal Justice: Beyond Ethnocentrism and Relativism' 6 
(2009) European Journal of Criminology 291-311. 
45 N. Bhuta, 'Governmentalizing Sovereignty: Indexes of State Fragility and the Calculability of 
Political Order' in Governance by Indicators: Global Power through Quantification and Rankings, 
Davis et. al., op.cit., note 24, 132–164. 
46 S.Karstedt, ‘Exit: The State. Globalisation, State Failure and Crime’, in D. Nelken (ed.) 
Comparative Criminal Justice and Globalisation (2011) 107-124. 
47 L. W Sherman, D. C Gottfredson, D. MacKenzie, J. Eck, P. Reuter, and S.D. Bushway,  
Preventing crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising. Research Brief. National 
Institute of Justice. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs 
(1998). 
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two kinds of indicators we have distinguished, often without paying much attention to the factors and 
values guiding the making of the indicators that they have chosen to build on or encompass.   
When we study comparison as a social practice, we therefore need to be especially attentive 
to such overlaps, interferences and transformations. What is the relationship between the normal and 
the normative? How does a fact for some become a standard for others?48 Above all, how do global 
social indicators make 'best' practice a synonym for that which is most highly ranked?    
 
Recognising the knowledge and governance effects of social indicators 
 
How far can the task of using ranking indicators for the goal of making places commensurable 
in terms of general standards be reconciled with the need to take local contexts seriously? To an extent 
getting 'the facts' right concerning local circumstances certainly does matter to the makers, users and 
targets of indicators (albeit in different ways). One of the ways indicators are said to be useful to 
sponsors and donors, for example, is the help they provide to counteract the danger of 
misrepresentation of results by those with whom they are engaging. More generally, the authority of 
global social indicators derives largely from their scientific and technical claims to successful 
description and measurement as they move us from the 'fact of authority' to the 'authority of the fact'. 
Blaustein et al. tell us that differences in context do need to be taken into account even when using 
ranking indicators to measure progress towards common standards. They claim, for example, that 'a 
risk-sensitive approach is certainly relevant to an international context given the likely diverse 
experiences of women victimized. As such, concerning  the goal of gender equality, they tell us that 
'working towards targets 5.2 and 5.3  'requires an appreciation of cultural and contextual risk factors 
and a rejection of homogenous group assumptions' (my underlining).49 But, as we have argued, it is 
far from obvious that indicators can be applied to a large number of societies for the purpose of 
ranking and standard setting without making what Blaustein et. al. themselves refer to as 'homogenous 
group assumptions'. To make progress we need to learn more about how ranking indicators actually 
 
48 An important Foucauldian analysis by Francois Ewald uses research on insurance and industrial 
standardisation to chart “normalisation” as a process that collapses the “norm” and the “normal”. F. 
Ewald, “Norms, Discipline, and the Law” (1990)  30 Representations 138. 
49 Blaustein id. op.cit. note 25, 778. N. Bhuta, D. V. Malito and G. Umbach,' Indicators in Global 
Governance and the rise of  reflexive indicator culture', in Malito, Umbach and Bhuta  (eds.), op.cit. 
note 39, 1-29 at 17, also call for 'a turn to more contextually constructed measures of corruption, 
governance and sustainability',  
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work, what Merry has described as their 'knowledge' and 'governance' effects. Only with this fully 
taken on board will it be possible to see how best to support and critique projects such as the UN's 
Sustainability goals.  
 Take first the so called 'knowledge effect'. The literature that discusses this aspect of 
indicators argues that the comparisons they incorporate are often deliberately superficial. As Davis 
et. al. put it, ‘the transformation of particularistic knowledge into numerical representations that are 
readily comparable strips meaning and context from the phenomenon'.50 To achieve their effects 
indicators rely on naming, quantification and measurement. As Merry tells us, 'naming produces 
knowledge by announcing categories to be measured as if they were self-evident, open to public 
scrutiny, simple in conception, and readily accessible, in a way that private opinions are not. But the 
labels thus chosen do not necessarily accurately reflect the data that produce the indicators.’51 
Decisions of what to measure and who does the measuring are all important. It is one thing to measure 
corruption by asking citizens or business people how often they have been asked for bribes. It is quite 
another if what is being surveyed is the tendency of different governmental departments to divert 
funds about which ordinary people may have little knowledge.52 Sometimes the organizations being 
assessed are even allowed to mark their own performance (as is also envisaged for the sustainability 
goals discussed by Blaustein et. al.).  
Most empirical case-studies of global social indicators provide evidence of the extent to which 
they can be and are misleading. They show us that indicators often mask large areas of missing or 
incomplete data, demonstrate inability to draw significant distinctions between entities that are 
nonetheless hierarchically ranked, conceal much higher levels of underlying uncertainty than the 
indicator depicts, and make questionable choices about the weighting of different components of 
composite indicators. Well known problems arise when monitoring organizations, such as those 
charged with showing how funds are being used in refugee relief, rely on information provided by 
fieldworkers. 'Raw information ... collected and compiled by workers near the bottom of organized 
 
50 Davis et. al. 2012 op.cit. note 24, 8. Writing about benchmarks, Homolar likewise points out that 
that 'the goal of international comparability is prioritised above contextual validity and accuracy', A. 
Homolar 'Human security benchmarks: Governing human wellbeing at a distance', 41 Review of 
International Studies, (2015) 843–863 at 861. 
51 S. E. Merry, 'Measuring the world: Indicators, Human Rights and Global Governance' (2011) 52 
Current Anthropology  s 84. 
52 M.Akech, 'Evaluating the Impact of Corruption Indicators on Governance Discourses in Kenya', in 
Merry, Davis and Kingsbury (eds.), op.cit., note 39, 248. 
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hierarchies ... is transformed so as to make it accessible and amenable to those near the top'.53 Refugee 
protection field officers, we are told, are asked to collect information on 154 detailed indicators.54 
Can they really be expected, to take just one of these, to count the number of latrines per 40,000 
refugees, given the lack of access and security inside the camps? Because they often have to combine 
the task of reporting with their main responsibilities in resolving problems on the ground, not 
surprisingly, they tend to give priority to doing the job of saving lives over that of monitoring 
compliance, especially where they consider it impossible to do both. Likewise, they may be able or 
willing to tell us about the distribution of water supplies but not the number of evictions of refugees 
(if for example this would risk alienating host states). 55 
But some criticisms of the accuracy of indicators go beyond pointing to matters that could, 
even in theory, be remedied. They tell us that they are 'constitutive', meaning by this that they are not 
neutral representations of the world but rather that they bring into being the social categories that they 
then rank. Ranking indicators in a sense constitute what they are supposed to be measuring.56 Social 
entities such as failed or fragile states do not pre-exist the effort to identify and rank them. Evaluation 
precedes as well as follows the deployment of social indicators. As Uruena, discussing rule of law 
indicators, tells us, 'indicators do not (indeed, cannot) measure reality objectively, in the way a 
thermometer would measure temperature. Rather, they inject... a normative analysis to the reality they 
measure, and constitute it.' 57  
Because what matters about indicators is above all whether others use them, rankings can 
easily become a ‘currency’. If a ranking is widely held to be credible, users will credit it (or, 
sometimes, be obliged to credit it) without checking its validity and discovering what lies behind the 
judgments they are based on. In sum, when indicators are successful, context as an empirical question 
becomes in a way irrelevant. Indicators' success lies in their being able to transform behaviour nearer 
 
53 Davis, Kingsbury and Merry, op.cit., note 39, 153. 
54 E. Dunlop, New Issues in Refugee Research: Research Paper No. 214 Indications of Progress? 
Assessing the Use of Indicators in UNHCR Operations: https://www.unhcr.org/4e15bb2a9.pdf 
accessed 31/1/2019. 
55 id. 
56 Even what is considered the appropriate unit of comparison, is produced through the action of 
differentiation as much as being its pre-existing object. 
57 R. Uruena, 'Indicators and the Law: A Case Study of the Rule of Law Index,' in Merry, Davis, 
and Kingsbury (eds.), op.cit. note 32, 75-102. Bhuta, Malito and Umbach op.cit., note 45, at 15, 
characterise this as ' post- metrological realism'. 
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to a standard. In a sense they work not because they are true, they are true because they work for 
certain users. In addition, because ranking indicators offer a hybrid combination of efforts to measure 
and evaluate, it can be hard to decide even what it means for them to 'work'. What has become known 
as Goodhart’s law states that once a social or economic indicator or other surrogate measure is made 
a target for the purpose of conducting social or economic policy, then (because of the reactions it will 
engender) it will lose the information content that would qualify it to play that role.  
While some scholars point to evidence that indicators do help achieve their effects because of 
their threat of sanctions,58 it is crucial to note that when places and people are judged according to 
metrics there is a well-known tendency for those involved to attempt to 'game' the system. This means 
that they set out to meet - or appear to meet - the target at the expense of the larger achievement that 
the indicator is supposed to represent. The 'larger context' crucial to the evaluating process is not only 
lost to view it is deliberately hidden from view. What if a notorious dictator busies himself in 
organising international and national efforts to curb human trafficking but allegedly does so in order 
to distract from his poor human rights record and as a way of limiting the extent to which his citizens 
travel abroad and learn about other societies?59 Should this be considered as an example of improperly 
'gaming' an indicator? Even if it is, should such activities nonetheless count as progress towards the 
target of reducing human trafficking?  
 These questions about what counts as success in using indicators brings us to the second issue 
concerning them, their so -called 'governance effects'. Here the problem raised has less to do with the 
accuracy of what indicators measure and more to with the politics of those making or using them. As 
Davis, Kingsbury and Merry write, indicators act as a 'technology of global governance', that is to 
say, they embody and implement political visions about existing problems and about how these 
problems have to be overcome. Such technologies of governance can be expected to affect: where, 
by whom, and in relation to whom governance takes place (the “topology of governance”); the 
processes through which standards are set; the processes through which decisions are made about the 
application of standards to particular cases; and the means and the dynamics of contesting and 
 
58 See e.g. J. G. Kelley and B. A. Simmons, 'Politics by Number: Indicators as Social Pressure in 
International Relations' (2015) 59 American Journal of Political Science 55. 
59 M. Zaloznaya and J. Hagan, 'Fighting Human Trafficking or Instituting Authoritarian Control? The 
Political Co-optation of Human Rights Protection in Belarus', in K.E. Davis et. al. (eds.), op.cit., note 
24, 344. 
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regulating exercises of power'.60 Values such as the rule of law or judicial independence arise in 
specific contexts and are  given different interpretations in different places. Similarly, as Homolar 
tells us, 'the process of translating the concept of human security into a series of tangible, measurable 
objects (‘reification’) relies on operationalizing normative assumptions about what constitutes 
‘liveable’ human existence into observable and measurable categories'... 'The indicators chosen to 
make judgements about the state of human security thereby function to both concretize and reproduce 
abstract ideas about what constitutes a ‘secure’ human life.61  
Indicators, Merry argues, “camouflage the political considerations that shape the collection 
and presentation of data'.'62 In particular, as Blaustein et. al. also note, the ability to construct 
indicators typically rests in the hands of experts who are typically from the Global North. In terms of 
our argument here this means that, behind the appearance of universalism, it is their theories and 
values - what makes sense in their own context - which tend to be imposed on others.63 As Merry also 
argues, we need to pay attention to the type of expertise involved in developing the indicator, what is 
measured, who funds the data collection, and which organization promotes the indicator. In her book 
most closely concerned with indicators in criminal justice she explains that in measuring levels of 
gender violence worldwide (one of the issues central to the paper by Blaustein et. al.), the choice to 
rely on measures of acts and injuries rather than subjective measurements of people’s fear displaces 
the decision about whether the violence is severe from the person experiencing it to the experts who 
decide which acts are severe.64 Likewise, Sokhi-Bulley, writing about the role of the  Human Rights 
Watch NGO in developing human rights governance, tells us that human rights and country 
 
60 K. E. Davis, 'Indicators as a Technology of Global Governance', Working Papers New York 
University School of Law (2010) 15.  
61 Homolar, op cit. 
62 S. Merry, The Seductions of Quantification: Measuring Human Rights, Gender Violence, and Sex 
Trafficking (2016). 
63 Speaking about the rule of law, Frydman and Twining note that procedural, substantive or 
institutional definitions can all be used. But each of these emphasizes some political concerns over 
others. Law itself is likely to work differently because there are likely to be a variety of other 
mechanisms that may substitute for it or conflict with it. But a common feature of many indicators is 
the assumption of what has been called ‘legal universalism'. B. Frydman and W. Twining ‘A 
symposium on global law, legal pluralism and legal indicators’ (2015) 47 The Journal of Legal 
Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 1-8. 
64 id.  
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specialists, including lawyers, reporters, activists, academics, transform the significance of human 
rights from being a potential discourse of resistance. Instead they are turned into apolitical technical 
indicators of the human rights performance of various actors. By these means, human rights discourse 
is ‘co-opted into a discourse through which power operates. 65 
On the other hand, it is important to note that empirical studies of what goes on in the forums 
where standards are developed and progress assessed show that these processes are not altogether 
one-sided. Those being measured, including relatively powerless countries when subjected to 
measurement and management by more powerful ones, can and do find ways of influencing the 
making and application of indicators.66 At times the formulation of the standards themselves may be 
revised after challenge.67 Proposed standards are transformed in situ - if not always for the good. 
Commenting on the deployment of the idea of the rule of law in Myanmar, Cheesman explains that  
'the rule of law serves as a trope for law and order'.68 We mistake the problem for a gap between 
principle and practice, between aspiration and reality, to be rectified by better training, laws and 
funding, when the problem is of a different nature. Partisans of law and order are not the occupants 
of low rungs on ladder to the rule of law; they are climbing a different ladder altogether'.69  
More commonly, however, some parts of the local population and the local elites do welcome 
the application of a new agenda as something they can use in local struggles. The standards enshrined 
in ranking indicators are accepted by at least some of those involved precisely because they believe 
that the introduction of aspirational standards can change rather than reflect existing local practices. 
Ranking indicators and claims about best practice therefore play a crucial role in debates about which 
standards are 'better' and how practices should be standardised. In Italy, for example, hegemonic 
Anglo-American ideas concerning the independence of the judiciary are deployed by leading local 
 
65 Sokhi-Bulley, op.cit. note 36. 
66 See e.g. M. Serban, 'Rule of Law Indicators as a Technology of Power in Romania', in Merry, Davis 
and Kingsbury eds op.cit., note 39, 199-221; and S. Musaraj, 'Indicators and Local Political Drama. 
Producing and Deploying Corruption Perception Data in Post-socialist Albania', in Merry, Davis and 
Kingsbury, op.cit. note 39, 222 -247. 
67 See e.g. the successful resistance by South Africa to the World Bank definition of better business 
standards, as described in D. Collier and P. Benjamin, 'Measuring Labor Market Efficiency: 
Indicators that Fuel an Ideological War and Undermine Social Concern and Trust in the South 
African Regulatory Process', in Merry, Davis, and Kingsbury (eds.), op.cit., note 39, 284-316. 
68 N. Cheesman, Opposing the rule of law (2015), 264. 
69 id. 259 (quoting Martin Krygier). 
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academics who echo politicians in criticizing what they claim is the way judges - and prosecutors - 
misuse their high level of autonomy. 70 But this begs the question of whether places at greater risk of 
political corruption might actually need a high level of protection.71  
 
What else can be done to overcome the drawbacks of global indicators? 
 
For some of the anthropologists most closely associated with the study of global social 
indicators the cure for the deficit in contextual understanding is to put more emphasis on qualitative 
research. Merry complains that 'the current rush to quantification risks sacrificing the insights of rich, 
ethnographic accounts'.72 What needs to be achieved is the addition of contextual materials which 
will help produce what Merry calls more 'indicator literacy'.73 Yet the methodological dispute 
between quantitative and qualitative approaches is one of principle, and is found dividing even those 
engaged in the first type of comparison where the purpose is to provide understanding for its own 
sake and not to rank a large number of units.74 There must be doubts whether adding a qualitative 
approach here would help or rather undermine the whole exercise of global ranking by showing the 
 
70 See D. Nelken, ‘Can Prosecutors be too Independent? An Italian case- study’, in T. Daems, S. 
Snacken, D. Van zyl Smit eds. European penology? (2013) 241- 261.  
71 op.cit. In the European Court of Human Rights the definition of what counts as the 'reasonable' 
length of court procedure for cases brought under article 6 of the ECHR tends to rely on what is the 
cross national average even if a countries' length in court procedures tend to be similar to the length 
of their bureaucratic processes more generally. 
72 Merry op.cit. (2016), note 67, 2. She complains that, 'detailed, qualitative studies are often 
dismissed as anecdotal. That really misses a lot of knowledge that is produced by deep, 
contextualized studies that give you a lot more insight into the way things work.' See also: 
http://www.law.nyu.edu/news/ideas/questioning-numbers-indicators-sally-merry-seductions-
quantification ,posted Aug 29, 2016, accessed 2/2/2019. 
73 id. 221. Blaustein et. al. , op.cit., note 25 write along similar lines. 
74 See e.g. M. Travers, 'Understanding Comparison in Criminal Justice Research: An Interpretive 
Perspective' (2008) 18  International Criminal Justice Review 389–405; and, more generally, J. 
Young,  The criminological imagination, (2011).   
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difficulty of commensuration. 75 Nor is there any reason to think that qualitative data is necessarily 
more emancipatory given the complex relationship between ethnographers and the later stages of 
colonialism.76 
Some commentators suggest that ranking indicators can be made honest by relying on 
competition between rival indicators in the market place.77 But consumers are often in no position to 
judge which indicators are (more) accurate. And they may in any case be constrained to accept their 
validity once they have become common currency. Alternatively, proponents of what they call 'global 
administrative law' suggest that indicators should be subjected to the same requirements as other 
public exercise of power such as transparent procedures, accountability and participation.78 This may 
perhaps help deal with issues of governance but it has little to do with the accuracy of indicators.  
An influential proposal by leading commentators and activists in the field about human rights, 
argues that a combination of contestability, and participation79 has the potential to make such 
indicators do good work. According to Rosga and Satterthwaite,  ‘the human rights community’s 
efforts to use statistics as part of a larger project of holding governments accountable to their popula-
tions, while it partakes of the same technologies of governmentality, can arguably be said to aim at 
different ends’.80 For them, [t]he value of indicators as a social technology cannot be determined in 
advance, nor on the basis of the fact that they are largely quantitative.'81 They admit that 'it may be 
true that quantitative methods, in their very abstraction and stripping away of contextualizing 
 
75 It is also important not to confuse the question of measurement with that of quantification. See A. 
Desrosières, 'Retroaction: How Indicators Feed Back onto Quantified Actors', in R. Rottenburg et. al. 
(eds.), op.cit., note 34,  329. 
76 P. Pels, 'The anthropology of Colonialism: Culture, History and the Emergence of Western 
Governmentality' (1997) 26 Annual Review of Anthropology 163-183. 
77 T. Büthe, 'Beyond Supply and Demand. A Political Economic Conceptual Model', in Davis et. 
al., op.cit. note 24, 29-51. 
78 S. Cassese, and L. Casini, ' Public Regulation of Global Indicators', in Davis, Kingsbury, and 
Merry eds. op.cit., note 16 ,465-474. 
79 For an account of how to empower those being measured so that they help to choose the relevant 
definition of their situation, see T. Pogge, 'Fighting Global Poverty' (2017) 13 International Journal 
of Law in Context 512. 
80 AJ. Rosga, and M.L. Satterthwaite 'The Trust in Indicators: Measuring Human Rights' (2009) 27  
Berkeley Journal of International Law, 253 –315 at 256..   
81 id. 
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information have particular – and especially high – risks for misuse by those with the power to 
mobilize them.'82 But they conclude that 'they are tools like any other. All tools can be misused; all 
social actors with power can misuse that power.' 83 They conclude, 'rather than trusting in numbers 
alone, those using human rights compliance indicators should embrace the opportunities presented 
by this new project, finding ways to utilize human rights indicators as a tool of global governance 
that allow the governed to form strategic political alliances with global bodies in the task of holding 
their governors to account'.84 But whilst this strategy might - just- be viable with respect to human 
rights or the rule of law, it is more difficult to see what space for contestation could or should be 
granted when it comes to indicators dealing with human trafficking and corruption.85  How much 
power to contest should be granted to those accused of doing too little to fight such practices or even 
perhaps acting in collusion with them? 
Enough has been said to show the need for more study of the processes by which similar 
standards are applied to unlike places or units. Fortunately there are already good models of such 
research often even involving participant or non-participant observational studies of committee work 
in NGO's, IGO's or at the United Nations.86 In an ethnography that deserves more recognition, 
Kruckenberg tells us about the contestation of human rights standards by states from the Global 
South. She points to the problem of distance, the dilemma of diplomatic feasibility and the competing 
pulls of change and consistency.87 Merry herself, in documenting what she calls 'the Cultural Work 
of Commensuration', tells us about the work of Friends of the Chair committee of the UN statistical 
Commission as it sought 'to differentiate between severe and moderate physical violence across 
 
82 id. 
83 A.J. Rosga and M.L .Satterthwaite, Measuring Human Rights': UN Indicators in Critical 
Perspective, in Davis et al. op.cit., note.24,  297-216 at 316. 
84 id.  
85 Sometimes, as in the case of indicators measuring fitness for accession to membership of the 
European Union, contestability is ruled out in practice because those being assessed are obliged to 
give prior consent to the process. It is the EU that lays down the rules. Admittedly, local actors can 
use indicators to gain power to make some progressive changes (for example in reducing 
discrimination). But this is achieved by endorsing, not by contesting, the requirements 
86 R. Nietzen and M. Sapignoli eds. Palaces of Hope (2017). 
87 L. J. Kruckenberg, The UNreal World of Human Rights. An Ethnography of the UN Committee 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (2012). 
 23 
countries, regions settings and a variety of social and cultural formations.'88 She tells us that this 
involves referring 'to the same thing, even though this thing is manifested differently in different 
places', designing the categories for counting which means inevitably lumping disparate things under 
one label and separating similar things that vary along a continuum under different labels. More 
empirical studies of how commensuration is accomplished in these situations, and what it reveals and 
what it obscures, will give us a better understanding of the limits of these ways of spreading best 
practices and ideal standards.  89 
 
88 Merry, 2016 op. cit.  note 67, 76. 
89 Ivory, op.cit. note 5, at 441 also concludes by asking for more 'consideration of how efforts to 
globally govern the crime of corruption may subtly enable or inhibit collective deliberation and 
individual human flourishing' (my underlining). 
